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We report results from an experiment that investigates truthfulness in self-reporting under 
different reporting regimes.  The experiment involves a production task with self-reporting of 
accidents, with reporting compulsory for some participants, but only voluntary for others.  
We find that dishonesty is prevalent, but accident reporting is more frequent with compulsory 
reporting compared with voluntary.  This suggests that lie aversion is a stronger force than 
the intrinsic motivation to voluntarily report, and that careful design of self-reporting regimes 
is necessary by enforcement agencies to achieve satisfactory compliance outcomes.  Our 
results are relevant for several areas beyond regulatory compliance, including dishonesty in 
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1. Introduction 
Honest communication is an important part of many economic transactions.  
Examples include claims about insurance, product quality and labelling, and workplace theft 
and shirking.  Honesty is also an important part of the regulatory framework with self-
reporting being the cornerstone of enforcement of environmental and occupational safety and 
health  regulations, among others.  Nevertheless Mazar and Ariely (2006) claim that 
dishonesty is rife in all levels of U.S. society, and they provide evidence of the high financial 
costs to society of this pervasive dishonesty.  This is also true in other countries, for example, 
fraud has been identified as the “most expensive crime category in Australia” (Lindley and 
Smith, 2011, p.5). 
Our aim is to investigate a specific type of dishonesty; the fraudulent provision of 
information by individuals, either via actual lying or through withholding of relevant 
information.
1  Although we focus on self-reporting in a regulatory context, our results are 
relevant for dishonesty in many areas such as  social security claims, insurance claims, 
workplace expense claims, income tax returns, and financial reporting.  We are particularly 
interested in how the design of self-reporting regimes evokes intrinsic motivations  for 
honesty and the consequent effect on the efficacy of the regime.
2 
Self-reporting is a common feature of many enforcement regimes, particularly for 
regulatory compliance.  Self-reporting of crimes and violations is encouraged by offering 
lower penalties for those who voluntarily report offenses.  The U.S. Federal Sentencing 
                                                 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines dishonesty as a “disposition to deceive, defraud, or steal”.  Dishonesty 
therefore encompasses a broad range of acts from providing false information to more direct forms of theft such 
as physically stealing money and equipment.  Dishonesty can be perpetrated against individuals (e.g. phishing 
scams, credit card fraud), businesses (e.g. employee theft and misuse of leave entitlements, false insurance 
claims), and government organisations (e.g. fraudulent social security claims, misuse of corporate credit cards). 
2 Intrinsic motivations have also been referred to as internal rewards (Mazar and Ariely, 2006) or moral rules 
(Shavell, 2002).  For a survey of the literature on the role of intrinsic motivation in contexts other than 
dishonesty, see Fehr and Falk (2002).  Benabou and Tirole (2003, 2006) provide a theoretical analysis. 
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Guidelines Manual (USSC, 2010, §5K2.16), for example, allows penalty reductions in the 
case of voluntary disclosure of an offense that “was unlikely to have been discovered 
otherwise”, while the Department of Justice’s, Corporate Leniency Policy, reduces penalties 
for firms which voluntarily disclose antitrust violations.  It is claimed that self-reporting will 
both improve compliance and reduce enforcement costs (EPA, 1999, 2000).  These benefits 
depend, in part, upon truthful reporting.
 3  
Not all reporting regimes are the same, however. Under many regulations, firms must 
submit regular compliance reports to the enforcement agency.  For example, occupational 
safety and health regulation requires annual reporting of workplace injuries and illnesses, 
with more prompt reporting required in the case of serious events. Under the Clean Water 
Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, major point sources must submit 
monthly reports of their compliance with permit limits.  On the other hand, many regulations 
contain no such requirements; instead, firms may be offered incentives to voluntarily disclose 
any violations that do occur (e.g. the EPA’s audit policy).
4     
One way to think about this difference is as compulsory versus voluntary reporting.  
Reporting by firms’ on corporate social responsibility is another example. Although reporting 
of  this kind  is voluntary in most countries, some argue  for it to be made compulsory 
(Overland, 2007).  Theoretically, there should be no difference between compulsory and 
voluntary reporting, as long as the economic incentives coincide.  Nevertheless, there seems a 
distinct difference between failing to voluntarily submit a report (an act of omission) and 
telling an outright lie (knowingly submitting a false report).  We conjecture that this 
difference will matter, and that aversion to blatant lies could lead to greater reporting of 
                                                 
3 Self-reporting is an important feature in other settings too.  For example, the Australian medical pay-for-
performance scheme for General Practitioners, relies on self-reports of the number of patients seen and tests 
completed (Scott et al., 2009). 
4 Firms are only eligible for the EPA’s audit policy if they disclose violations that would not otherwise be 
uncovered via mandatory monitoring (EPA, 2000). 4 
 
violations in the compulsory self-reporting treatment than in the voluntary one.  On the other 
hand, being compelled to submit a report  could lead to crowding out of the  intrinsic 
motivation  to voluntarily report  and therefore  we may observe less reporting in the 
compulsory case.  While  theoretical models tend to ignore such  distinctions,  behavioral 
influences  may  affect the success  of enforcement regimes and therefore  have significant 
policy implications. 
The rational economic model (Becker, 1968) assumes that people are dishonest 
whenever it is financially advantageous to do so.  To deter such acts therefore requires an 
increase in the financial disincentives such as the likelihood of detection and the amount of 
punishment when caught.  At the other end of the spectrum to the rational economic actor, is 
someone who is always moral and never dishonest regardless of the financial incentive to do 
so.
5  Evidence suggests however that most people fall in-between these two extremes, being 
influenced by both economic incentives (e.g. Grogger, 1991) and intrinsic motivations which 
could include both moral and social considerations (e.g. Hurkens and Kartik, 2009).  Indeed 
the behavioral approach to law and economics (Garoupa, 2003; McAdams and Ulen, 2008) 
has long challenged the standard neoclassical approach observing that “people exhibit 
bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower” (Jolls et al., 1998, 
p.1471).  Of particular relevance for our work are the role of bounded self-interest and the 
influence of social norms. 
We use an  economic experiment to investigate how the type of reporting affects 
incentives for dishonesty in self-reporting.  Specifically, we design a production task with 
self-reporting of accidents where some participants faced compulsory reporting while for 
                                                 
5 Since our interest is in dishonesty associated with financial gain, this spectrum omits situations where it may 
be “moral” to lie (so-called “white lies”) to avoid hurting others.  Additionally some people may get pleasure 
from lying (so-called “pathological liars”) but this should only be a small part of the population and not affect 
our results due to randomization of participants across treatments. 5 
 
others it was voluntary.  We seek to measure both the extent of dishonesty, along with which 
type of intrinsic motivation is strongest in our setting.  We isolate the latter effect by keeping 
the monetary (extrinsic) incentives for dishonesty constant across the two types of reporting. 
The  paper  closest  to our research is Murphy and Stanlund (2008), in which the 
authors focus on the incentives for voluntary disclosure of violations when firms may be 
unaware of their compliance status. They find that voluntary policies can be effective for a 
certain range of penalties and in the presence of information about compliance status.  In a 
paper on reporting in dynamic  emission markets, Stranlund et al. (2011)  examine 
enforcement and compliance when banking of permits is allowed.  They find that imposing 
high permit violation penalties is not effective in these markets, and suggest that the main 
task of enforcement is to promote truthful self-reporting.  In their experiment, reporting is 
compulsory.   
We compare compulsory  and voluntary self-reporting  regimes within a single 
experiment.  This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to focus on the behavorial aspects of 
self-reporting using experiments and provides insights on how individuals would make 
decisions when faced with different self-reporting regimes.  In addition, we include controls 
for risk preference and inherent dishonesty; the latter measured via a task where subjects have 
the opportunity to steal real physical money, by taking more than they have actually earned in 
a mathematical game.  This control task measures dishonest behavior at the individual level 
in situations where there is no formal probability of detection or punishment and when there 
are significant economic gains to being dishonest. Any abstention from dishonesty can 
therefore be interpreted as an attribute that some individuals have - an inherent characteristic 
or  an  influence of social norms.  This task allows us to classify people into honest and 
dishonest categories and use it to understand behavior in different reporting regimes.  6 
 
We use an individual task to examine self-reporting because it is closer to the types of 
“white collar” crimes we are interested in studying where the party being lied to or harmed by 
the dishonesty may be somewhat distant from, and possibly unknown to, the decision maker.  
In contrast, most of the existing experimental economics literature on dishonesty uses two-
player communication games.
6  
We find that reporting of accidents was more frequent with compulsory reporting 
(20% of accidents) than with voluntary reporting (10% of accidents) suggesting that aversion 
to overt lying was stronger than feeling good about voluntarily cooperating.  Nevertheless, 
dishonesty was rife with almost everyone dishonest in the reporting task, with only 4% of 
subjects always reporting an accident, and around half of the subjects never reporting.  These 
results suggest that careful design  of self-reporting regimes is necessary by enforcement 
agencies to achieve satisfactory compliance outcomes. Many self-reporting programs in the 
field use voluntary reporting rules. Direct empirical evidence on their performance is 
however difficult as critical variables such as frequency of accidents are not observed by 
researchers. Lab experiments such as the one reported in this paper can improve our 
understanding of the behavioral impacts of different self-reporting regimes. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 explains the experimental design and 
procedure.  Section 3 presents the results, while Section 4 discusses explanations for our 
findings.  Section 5 concludes by describing the broader policy implications and suggesting 
avenues for future research.  
 
   
                                                 
6 See Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Sánchez-Pagés and 
Vorsatz (2007, 2009), Dreber and Johannesson (2008), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Lundquist et al. (2009), 
Innes and Mitra (2009) and Rode (2010).  Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) study lying in an individual task but 
only observe the distribution of responses not individual lying behaviour. 
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2. Experimental Design 
2.1 Overview 
  All subjects participated in a reporting task, which involved a production decision, 
where production had a potential to cause an “accident” for which they could be penalised.  
This was repeated for 30 rounds, where in the first 10 rounds they face a conventional 
enforcement regime, followed by 20 rounds where reporting was possible.  Around half of 
the subjects experienced voluntary self-reporting,  while  the other half experienced 
compulsory self-reporting.  That is, we use a between-subjects design for these treatments, 
with subjects randomly assigned to the treatments.  Following completion of the reporting 
task, subjects answered some demographic questions, plus some questions about attitudes 
towards lying and their previous participation in dishonest behavior.
7  Before undertaking the 
reporting task, subjects participated in two short control tasks: a lottery task, designed to 
measure risk preferences and a theft task, designed to measure their underlying motivation for 
honesty. 
The  majority of the experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) except for the theft control task, which was conducted manually using 
pen and paper.
8  We discuss the reasons for these design choices in the following section.  In 
addition to a $5 show-up fee, subjects were  paid their earnings from one round in the 
reporting task and for one decision in the lottery task.  Subjects paid themselves in the theft 
task.    The experiment lasted around 90 minutes, with average earnings being AU$43 
(approximately US $40), of which $7 on average came from the theft task. 
The decision and round for payment in the reporting and lottery tasks respectively 
were selected at the end of the entire experiment, using physical randomization devices to 
                                                 
7 These additional questions were adapted from Lundquist et al. (2009) and Nagin and Pogarsky (2003). 
8 A copy of the experimental instructions is included in the appendix. 8 
 
enhance credibility.  Specifically, a ten-sided dice (rolled twice) was used for the lottery task, 
and a bingo cage, containing the balls 1 to 30, for the reporting task.  The experiments were 
held at the University of Queensland.  There were 115 participants, with 59 participants 
randomly allocated to the voluntary treatment and 56 to the compulsory treatment.  The 
participants were predominantly undergraduate students (90%), with around 60% being 
business and economics students. 
 
2.2 The Reporting Task 
In this task, subjects made a “production decision” where production activities can 
potentially cause an “accident”, but the probability of an accident can be lowered for a cost.  
There are 30 rounds of such decisions.  In the first ten rounds, all subjects face a conventional 
enforcement (CE) regime where there is some probability of being inspected (r) and a fine (f) 
for discovered accidents.  These ten rounds allow subjects to learn about the task, and provide 
a baseline for comparison with their later decisions.
9 
In the following 20 rounds, subjects face one of two possible reporting regimes – 
either  voluntary reporting  or  compulsory reporting.  In  voluntary, following an  accident, 
subjects are given the binary choice: “Would you like to report the accident?” with response 
options of “Yes” or “No”.  If they do report, then they pay a self-reporting fine (s), otherwise 
they face CE.  In contrast, with compulsory, subjects must fill out a report, and are asked 
“What would you like to say in the report?”  The response options are “I had an accident” or 
                                                 
9 Prior to facing each regime subjects answered a series of quiz questions designed to assess their understanding 
of the instructions, and then participated in two practice rounds. 9 
 
“I did not have an accident”.  As with voluntary, a reported accident is assessed a fine of s, 
otherwise they face CE.
10 
The reporting task was framed using the language described here – i.e. we used the 
terminology of accident, inspection, and fine. While this is a deviation from the standard 
practice of using neutral language in economics experiments, since our aim was to understand 
attitudes towards dishonesty in a real-life situation of compliance with taxes, environmental, 
and health and safety programs, we used context specific language. 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The reporting task is inspired by the theoretical models of self-reporting developed by 
Malik (1993), Heyes (1996), and Innes (2001a), among others.
11  We follow here the model 
and notation of Innes (2001a).  Risk neutral firms choose an accident prevention effort or 
level of care  (x), which determines the probability of an  accident occurring: 
𝑝(𝑥),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝′(𝑥) < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝′′(𝑥) > 0.  Let F be the expected penalty if an accident occurs, 
which takes on the value s if the firm self-reports and rf if not.  The firm’s problem is to 
choose x to minimize its expected costs, 𝑥 + 𝑝(𝑥)𝐹  ⟹ 𝑥∗(𝐹).  Assuming that in the case of 
indifference, firms will self-report, self-reporting occurs when 𝑠 ≤ 𝑟𝑓.  The enforcement 
agency will set 𝑠 = 𝑟𝑓 to economise on enforcement costs, without any loss of deterrence 
(because  𝑥∗(𝑠) = 𝑥∗(𝑟𝑓) ).  A major advantage of self-reporting is the reduction in 
enforcement expenditures that arises because the agency need no longer inspect firms that 
                                                 
10 With compulsory reporting, subjects must file a report even if they do not have an accident however we did 
not permit them to file a false report in this case (i.e. reporting an accident when one did not occur).  In the 
voluntary case, it did not make sense to ask the reporting question if no accident occurred. 
11 These models contrast with the more general crime model of Kaplow and Shavell (1994), who assume that 
potential offenders are heterogeneous in terms of their gains from crime and have a binary choice to commit  a 
harmful act or not. 10 
 
self-report accidents.  Instead, only non-reporters have to be inspected with probability r.
12  
This advantage however relies on truthful reporting of accidents. 
A practical implementation of self-reporting however requires a strict incentive for 
self-reporting (i.e. s < rf), leading to a weakening of deterrence, and hence more accidents. 
As a result, while self-reporting may generate enforcement economies, this may come at the 
expense of environmental protection, a concern expressed in the self-reporting literature (e.g. 
Innes, 2001a; Murphy and Stranlund, 2008). 
Note that this model does not distinguish between compulsory and voluntary self-
reporting, because theoretically there is no difference between the two (provided the 
monetary incentives are identical).
13  Nevertheless, there are a number of behavioral reasons 
why we may observe a difference.  For example, compulsory reporting may crowd out any 
intrinsic motivation to voluntarily report, leading to less reporting in the compulsory 
treatment.  However an opposing force like aversion to lying can arise in this treatment as 
subjects who chose not to report have to explicitly send a false report (i.e. lie) and we may 
find this aversion increases reporting in the compulsory treatment. Thus, whether we observe 
higher levels of reporting in the compulsory treatment or in the voluntary treatment depends 
on the relative magnitude of these effects and cannot be stated a priori. 
 
2.2.2 Lab Implementation 
To implement this in the lab we made several adjustments to simplify the cognitive 
burden on subjects.  The first was to have subjects directly choose the probability of an 
                                                 
12 Additional potential benefits of self-reporting are earlier clean-up in the case of persistent pollutants (Heyes 
1996), guaranteed remediation of damages (Innes 1999), and reduced firm expenditures on avoiding 
apprehension (Innes 2001b). 
13 Few theoretical models make any distinction between voluntary and compulsory self-reporting, with most 
implicitly assuming the voluntary case, although this is rarely made explicit.  An exception is Malik (1993) who 
models compulsory self-reporting, in which case a failure to report is interpreted as a violation. 11 
 
accident (p), rather than effort (x) itself.  The second was to limit the number of choices 
available to subjects.  The latter also enhanced salience, as it increased the difference between 
two options, and was acceptable because our main interest was in the reporting stage.  We 
translated the problem into an equivalent maximization problem by including a fixed amount 
of revenue (R) each period.  Then the problem becomes to choose p to maximize 𝑅 − 𝑥(𝑝) −
𝑝𝐹.
14  Subjects were told 𝑅 − 𝑥(𝑝) which is described as their “trading profit”.  The five 
options available to the subjects are shown in Table 1. 
The production and enforcement parameters were held fixed across all rounds of both 
treatments.  Random draws were conducted each round to determine whether an accident or 
inspection occurred.
15  Subjects received their earnings from one randomly selected round 
from the 30 rounds. 
Given our interest in studying the incentive (aversion) to lie we chose the enforcement 
parameters such that s > rf.  In this case, all except the very risk averse will have a monetary 
incentive to lie therefore  creating a potential conflict with  one’s  “moral incentive”.  
Alternatively, if we had set s < rf then there would be no monetary gain from lying and all 
but the most risk loving would self-report.
16  Hence in this case it would be difficult to isolate 
the impact of the monetary incentive from the moral incentive on dishonest behavior as both 
these effects would lead to less lying.  A further constraint on our choices was the need to 
avoid bankruptcy in the experiment, which limits the upside for our fines and hence potential 
loss from being caught out. 
                                                 
14 An interior solution requires that 𝑥′(𝑝) < 0, while the second order condition for a maximum requires that 
𝑥′′(𝑝) > 0.  This is equivalent to an increasing (i.e. convex) cost of reducing accidents.  The actual functions 
used were 𝑅 = 33.21  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥(𝑝) =
2
0.05+0.3𝑝. 
15 To increasing comparability across sessions, we made the random draw prior to any sessions, and used the 
same random numbers in each session. 
16 Note that an optimal self-reporting regime (from the theoretical literature) would set 𝑠 ≤ 𝑟𝑓.  Arguably 
however, the case of s > rf is more realistic as we do not observe full (voluntary) self-reporting. 12 
 
The probability of inspection (r) was set at ½ and the fine for a violation discovered 
via conventional enforcement (f) was set at $15.  The fine for a self-reported violation (s) was 
set at $12.  The expected fine under conventional enforcement is then $7.50, so self-reporting 
yields a fine that is higher by $4.50, which should provide a sufficient monetary incentive to 
lie.  Note further that the optimal risk neutral accident probability choice was 80% with 
conventional enforcement or if they intend to not report (lie or withhold); compared with 
60% if they plan to self-report.  Risk aversion should lead to greater care being taken 
reducing the probability of having an accident. 
The ex post incentive to lie is smaller than $4.50 for the risk averse, and larger for risk 
lovers.  Specifically for the risk averse, the gain from lying will decrease with the degree of 
risk preference and with the trading profit (lower accident probability).  Using the constant 
relative risk aversion utility function with a coefficient of 0.5, we can compute the following 
ex post gain from lying = certainty equivalent of lying – certain payoff if self-report.  This 
gain ranges from $3.77 when p=100%, to $3.41 when p=40%, and $1.06 when p=20% (the 
latter is rarely chosen). 
 
2.3 Control Tasks 
While the theoretical model assumes risk neutrality, we expect that risk preferences 
will play a role in the lab.  We employ a lottery task similar to the one described in Brown 
and Stewart (1999) to control for this.  Prior to undertaking the main reporting task, all 
subjects made a series of ten lottery choices between a risky option and a certain amount.
17  
The point of switching from the certain option to the risky option provides a measure of risk 
                                                 
17 The lottery choices are in the experimental instructions in the Appendix. 13 
 
preference.  Specifically, switching after Game 5 indicates risk aversion, switching before 
Game 5 indicates risk loving, and switching exactly at Game 5 implies risk neutrality. 
To control for the inherent tendency to be dishonest we used the matrix task devised 
by Mazar et al. (2008) however, in contrast to their experiment, we collect individual level 
data.
18  Subjects were given a sheet of 20 matrices, where each matrix contains 12 three-digit 
numbers (e.g. 5.34).  The task was to find a pair of numbers in each matrix that add up 
exactly to 10.00.  A sample matrix is shown in Figure 1.  The task is made more difficult 
because not all of the matrices have solutions, of which subjects were made aware.  Subjects 
were given five minutes to solve as many matrices as possible and were told that they would 
earn $1 for each correctly solved matrix. 
After the five minutes was over, subjects were instructed to count the number of 
correctly solved matrices and record this number on their collection slip.
19  We then collected 
the folded matrix sheets and placed them in a sealed envelope, emphasizing that we would 
not open the envelope until everyone had left the lab.  On each desk, we had already placed a 
small envelope containing 20 $1 coins, and subjects were instructed to pay themselves using 
this money.  Afterwards they were told to put their completed collection slip with any 
remaining money in the small envelope, seal the envelope, and leave it on their desk.
20  
Again, we emphasized that the envelope would not be collected until after everyone had left 
the lab. 
  We chose to do this part of the experiment manually to enhance credibility – 
specifically to convince subjects that their decisions were anonymous. We wanted to assure 
the subjects that we would not be deceiving them and checking up on them while they were 
                                                 
18 Mazar et al. (2008) only measure dishonesty at the group (or session) level as they do not collect subjects’ 
matrix sheets.  
19 The collection slip read “I got _______ Boxes, which translates to $ _______ (=$1.00 per Box)”. 
20 Both the collection slip and the matrix sheet had an ID number on it which allowed us to match their answers 
and the amount they paid themselves. 14 
 
still in the lab.  We thought this would be more believable to subjects than if the task was 
computerised and the data immediately accessible to us.
 21  We hoped to measure a baseline 
level of the dishonesty for each individual from this task, where the probability of detection 
was effectively zero.  
 
From previous results in the literature, we believed that $1 per matrix would be 
sufficient (i.e. salient) to encourage cheating.  In addition, as not all of the matrices had 
solutions, there was considerable scope for cheating even for top performers.  The total 
incentive to cheat ranged from $10, for anyone who solved all ten matrices that had solutions, 
to $20 for someone who solved none. 
Mazar et al. (2008) note several advantages of using this task to measure dishonesty.  
First, subjects consider that the outcome is predominantly effort related rather than IQ 
related.  Second, subjects can readily evaluate their own performance – they know if they 
have the correct answer or not.  This means that any dishonest gain can be reasonably 
interpreted as cheating, rather than as a genuine mistake.  This control task therefore allows 
us to measure the degree and existence of dishonesty at an individual level, in a situation 
where there is no plausible way of being detected or punished. Subjects undertake a real 
effort task and they deal with real cash, improving the external validity of our design.  While 
theory predicts that reporting behavior is invariant to our treatments, this measure may help 
us understand any differences we observe by identifying the types of people most affected.  
 
   
                                                 
21 This is also the reason why we did this task before the main reporting task as the participants may have been 
less likely to believe that they would not be checked up on if the control had followed the reporting task.  In 





Using the experimental design described in Section 2 we aim to consider the strength 
of different types of intrinsic motivations within the reporting task.  Across the voluntary and 
compulsory treatments, the economic incentive to report is held constant, but differences in 
reporting could occur due to the explicit lie required with compulsory reporting or the 
crowding out of voluntary motivations to report.  
We present our results in the next three subsections, beginning by describing the 
degree of dishonesty in the main reporting task and the control task.  We then compare 
voluntary and compulsory reporting.  Finally, we describe how accident prevention choices 
vary across enforcement regimes and treatments.  Summary statistics for the variables 
discussed below are provided in Table 2a. 
 
3.1 Are individuals dishonest? 
In the reporting task, we observe whether subjects reported an accident.  Hence 
dishonesty in this task can be defined as the proportion of times an accident was not reported 
over 20 periods.
22  Only 15% of the accidents that occurred were reported, with 47% of the 
subjects never reporting an accident and only 4% of the subjects always reporting accidents. 
In the control task, subjects are asked to pay themselves depending on how many of 
the 20 matrices they solved and leave the rest of the money in an envelope on the table.  
Given that subjects can readily determine their performance in this  matrix task, we can 
interpret dishonesty as a situation in which subjects take more money than they are entitled 
to.  On average subjects correctly solved 4.5 matrices during the five minutes, with only two 
                                                 
22 With voluntary reporting, failing to report an accident involves withholding of information, while with 
compulsory reporting an outright lie is required; hence, we can measure two different types of dishonesty. 16 
 
able to solve all ten, and six solving none.  The average dishonest gain was $2.43, far below 
the maximum possible gain, which was $15.48 on average and ranged from $10 to $20.
23 
We construct three related but distinct measures of dishonesty  using the above 
interpretation.  Our first measure is a binary indicator of dishonesty – i.e. do they take more 
money than they are entitled to?  Using this variable, we find that 33% of the subjects were 
dishonest in the control task.  That is, two-thirds of the subjects were willing to give up a gain 
of $10 or more to be honest.  The second measure is the magnitude of dishonesty, which is 
illustrated in Figure 2 where the size of the circles reflects the number of observations at each 
point.  The larger circles along the diagonal show that most people are honest, with points 
above the diagonal representing subjects who took more than they had earned.  Of the 33% 
who lie (38 subjects), 37% keep one dollar more than they should, 42% keep ten dollars or 
more than they should, and 18% of the subjects keep fifteen dollars or more.  The figure also 
suggests that the dishonest were not just those who did poorly in the matrix task.  The third 
measure is the percentage of maximum dishonest gain that is possible for each subject, given 
how many answers they get right in the task. We find that of those who are dishonest, 26% 
take the maximum amount possible.
24 
To measure the effectiveness of our control measure, we compared dishonesty in the 
control task with the frequency of self-reporting, finding that those who were dishonest in the 
control task reported less often in the reporting task (pairwise correlation; p value = 0.06).  
Investigating the correlation separately for the two types of reporting, we  find that this 
                                                 
23 The maximum possible dishonest gain equals $20 minus the number of correctly solved matrices. 
24 We also constructed a measure of false reporting by comparing the number of matrices each subject reported 
solving with the actual number correctly solved.  Honest subjects always correctly reported.  Of the 38 dishonest 
subjects, six correctly reported the number of matrices they solved (but still took more money) while the other 
32 overstated this.  Interestingly of these 32, 27 filed a report to match what they took.  It is also interesting to 
note that the majority of the dishonest (74%) also falsified their matrix sheet by ticking extra “Got It” boxes to 
match what they reported.  Note however, there were no consequences to false reporting in this task as the 
probability of detection was implied to be zero. 17 
 
correlation is only significant in the voluntary treatment (p value = 0.02) but not in the 
compulsory  treatment  (p value  =  0.65), providing some early indicators of treatment 
differences. 
Responses to our survey questionnaire give an alternative measure of participation in 
dishonest behavior and attitudes to lying.  As reported in Table 2b, around one-third of 
respondents indicated they have lied in an application at least once, and a similar number 
have lied when selling something.  About one-quarter of respondents reported having driven 
with an excess blood alcohol level, while only 8% have knowingly lied on their income-tax 
return.  With regards to attitudes to lying, about half of the subjects agreed (either slightly or 
strongly) that “there are no degrees of lying”, and about three-quarters indicated 
responsiveness  to the monetary incentives associated with lying.
25   Correlations between 
these survey responses and the measures of dishonesty in the reporting and control tasks are 
reported in the final two columns of Table 2b.  Attitudes towards lying show a significant 
correlation with behavior in the reporting task.   
 
3.2 Does the proportion of reports submitted vary by treatment? 
  Figure 3a shows that the proportion of individuals who report accidents over the 20 
periods is higher in the compulsory treatment as compared to the voluntary treatment. This 
difference is highest in the middle periods: periods 16-25 (9% in voluntary and 20% in 
compulsory).  Figure 3b shows the distribution of the proportion of reports by treatment.  The 
graph shows the mass shifts to the right (i.e. more reporting) when reporting is compulsory.  
It is also  worth noting that all of the five subjects who always reported were in the 
compulsory treatment.  The average proportion of accidents  reported  (averaged across 
                                                 
25 In contrast, only around 20% of the subjects in Lundquist et al. (2009) believed there are no degrees of lying, 
and only 4% of these strongly agreed. 18 
 
periods and individuals) in the compulsory treatment is double that for the voluntary 
treatment  (20% versus 10%, p value: 0.09, using a non-parametric ranksum test).  This 
difference is also higher for subjects who were dishonest in the theft task (5% versus 18%, p 
value = 0.005).  For subjects who were not dishonest, there is no statistical difference in the 
proportion of reports across treatments though reporting is higher as a proportion of accidents 
in the compulsory treatment (13% versus 21%).  By classifying subjects as honest and 
dishonest, the control task helps identify how each of these types would behave in different 
self- reporting regimes.  
Table 3 reports estimates from a probit regression, which models the decision of the 
subject to report an accident.  It accounts for individual specific heterogeneity by clustering 
standard errors at the subject level.
26   We present different specifications to examine if 
reporting of an accident can be explained by the treatment subjects are in, the period in which 
they make their decision, demographic characteristics, and control measures of risk 
preference and dishonesty in the theft task.
27  The coefficient for the treatment variable is 
always statistically significant, with subjects in the compulsory treatment having about a 10% 
higher probability of reporting accidents in all specifications. 
In terms of demographics, older subjects have a higher probability of reporting, while 
those who answered more quiz questions correctly reported less often.
28  To control for the 
monetary incentive to report, across subjects, we include measures of the accident probability 
chosen, a measure of risk aversion, and the interaction between the two.  Recall that the 
experimental parameters were set so that it was financially advantageous to not report, with 
the expected gain from not reporting equal to $4.50.  For risk averse subjects, the certainty 
                                                 
26 We also estimated random effects probit models for these specifications and the results are practically 
identical to the ones reported.  
27 Results from the lottery choice control task indicated that 77% of participants were risk averse, 9% risk 
neutral, and the remaining 15% risk lovers.   
28 As noted earlier, quiz questions were used to assess subjects’ understanding of the experimental instructions. 19 
 
equivalent of this gain from dishonesty decreases with their choice of accident probability 
and the degree of risk aversion.  Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 2.2.2, this gain from 
dishonesty  remains  positive  for all except the extremely risk averse who choose a low 
accident probability.  Since the monetary incentive is for everyone to be dishonest, there 
should be no relationship between these variables and the probability of reporting, and the 
results in Table 5 are consistent with this.
29  Subjects who cheated by a larger magnitude in 
the  control  task, have a lower probability of reporting accidents, consistent with the 
correlations reported earlier.
30  Controlling for inherent dishonesty while significant, does not 
alter the main conclusion. 
Overall, our results show that behavior is significantly different in the two treatments, 
with the propensity to report more in compulsory than in the voluntary treatment.   We find 
this difference despite identical monetary incentives in the two treatments, indicating the 
important role of intrinsic  incentives.  We find  that  the lie aversion effect seems to be 
stronger than the crowding out of intrinsic motivation effect. 
 
3.3 Additional Results 
In this section, we examine whether individuals take less care to avoid an accident in 
the self-reporting regulatory regime than with conventional enforcement, and whether this 
differs by treatment.  Recall that a common concern expressed over self-reporting regimes is 
the potential weakening of deterrence that results from lowering the penalty associated with 
an accident (i.e. because 𝑠 < 𝑟𝑓).  As explained above, in our experiment we set 𝑠 > 𝑟𝑓 to 
                                                 
29 Using a continuous measure of risk preference yields similar results.  Including separate dummy variables for 
each level of ProbChoice and interacting these with Risk Averse showed that those choosing an accident 
probability of 40% (i.e. ProbChoice=4) had a 9% lower probability of reporting an accident, but other results 
remain unchanged.  It is likely that subjects who have already paid a moderate amount to avoid an accident may 
feel that having an accident was unfair and may feel entitled to not report it.  Note that the lowest accident 
probability (20%) was only rarely chosen. 
30 Alternative definitions of dishonesty, for example, the percentage of maximum dishonest gain or a binary 
measure of dishonesty, give similar results.  20 
 
introduce a conflict between the monetary and moral incentives for self-reporting.  Therefore, 
deterrence should not be weakened, but may instead be strengthened if subjects opt for self-
reporting.
31 
To examine this issue we explore subjects’ choice of probability of accident in the 
reporting task, i.e., do they pay less to avoid an accident in a self-reporting regime than in the 
conventional enforcement regime. In each session, in the first 10 periods, subjects make 
decisions under the conventional enforcement rules. We find that the average choice  of 
accident probability is lower in the conventional enforcement periods than in the self-
reporting periods (p value = 0.07, using a sign rank test). A closer inspection of the five 
options reveals that option 1, which is associated with a 100% accident probability, was 
chosen significantly more often in the self-reporting periods (33% versus 23%, significant 
using a ranksum test, p value: 0.000).  The option with the highest care and hence the lowest 
accident probability (option 5) was chosen significantly less often in the self-reporting 
treatment (0.78% versus 2.43%, p value: 0.000). The options in the middle were not 
statistically different across the self-reporting and the conventional enforcement regimes.   
These results suggest that, contrary to the economic incentives, introducing self-reporting 
actually weakened deterrence.
  32   This somewhat puzzling finding could have significant 
implications for regulators, as it suggests that self-reporting may affect behaviour in a way 
that goes beyond changes in the economic incentives.
33   
It is interesting to examine if individuals choose different levels of care (i.e., do they 
pay less to avoid an accident) across the voluntary and compulsory reporting treatments.  
                                                 
31 As noted in Section 2.2.2, the optimal risk neutral accident probability choice was 80% with conventional 
enforcement or if they intend to not report (lie or withhold); compared with 60% if they plan to self-report. 
32 An ordered probit regression on the probability of accident chosen by individuals over time corroborates the 
findings above with the coefficient on the dummy for the Conventional Enforcement regime positive  and 
statistically significant.  These results are not reported in the paper to save space. 
33 The self-reporting periods always followed the conventional enforcement periods, hence order effects may 
explain the lower deterrence in the self-reporting periods. This is a worthy topic for further study. 21 
 
Since compulsory reporting leads to greater reporting of accidents, it should also lead to 
greater care being taken.  Figure 4 presents the five options individuals choose from in the 
two treatments, averaged over periods.  We observe that in the compulsory treatment, options 
2 (accident probability=80%) and 3 (accident probability =60%) were chosen more often than 
in the voluntary treatment, while options 1 (accident probability=100%) and 4 (accident 
probability =40%) were selected less often.  Except for the change in option 3, these all 
reflect significant changes (p values < 0.02, rank sum test).  Overall, these suggest a tendency 
away from the extreme left of the distribution when we shift from voluntary to compulsory 
reporting.  When we average across all five of the options, we find that the average level of 
care chosen in the compulsory treatment is marginally higher than the average level chosen in 
the voluntary treatment (2.32 versus 2.27).
34   
Our results provide evidence that self-reporting schemes can lead individuals to 
choose higher accident probabilities and within self-reporting, voluntary reporting can create 
incentives for individuals to exert less care. These need to be considered in field 
implementations of these regulatory policies. 
 
4. Discussion 
We can draw four results from our experiment.  First, regarding the incidence of 
dishonesty  in self-reporting, we found that nearly everyone  was dishonest at some point 
during the reporting task.  This is most striking in the compulsory treatment, where not 
reporting an accident required an outright lie.  Only five subjects (4%) always reported an 
accident in this treatment.  Second, we found that reporting occurred significantly more often 
                                                 
34 To examine this further, we estimate ordered probit models, where the dependent variable is the probability of 
choosing options 1 to 5. The estimates are consistent with the non-parametric results such that in the compulsory 
treatment, subjects choose higher levels of care, but this is not statistically significant.  These results are not 
reported in the paper to save space.  22 
 
in the compulsory reporting regime than with voluntary reporting, a result that is contrary to 
theoretical predictions. This implies that the aversion to lying effect dominates the crowding 
out of intrinsic motivation to voluntarily report.  Third, the control task results suggest that 
those who were most affected by the compulsory treatment were those with low inherent 
motivations for honesty where the aversion to telling an outright lie caused a number of those 
who were dishonest in the theft task to report accidents. The behavior of those who were 
honest in the theft task is invariant to self-reporting regimes.   Fourth, the introduction of self-
reporting, and in particular voluntary self-reporting,  appears to  lessen the incentive for 
accident prevention. 
We conjectured two intrinsic factors that might lead to a difference between reporting 
of accidents between the voluntary and compulsory regimes.  First, we conjectured that 
compulsory reporting might create a crowding out effect: i.e., crowd out the intrinsic 
incentive to report that may exist in the voluntary reporting case, resulting in fewer reports of 
violations in the compulsory case than in the voluntary case.
  Second, we conjectured that the 
aversion to lying would work in the opposite direction, with subjects being less willing to tell 
overt lies, and so reporting would be more frequent in the compulsory case.  For example, 
Hurkens and Kartik (2009) found that people were less willing to tell “big” and “solemn” 
lies.  Our results found that the aversion to lying effect was stronger than the crowding out 
effect. 
An explanation for the aversion to lying effect can be found in the model of Mazar 
and Ariely (2006), who propose a non-monotonic relationship between economic incentives 
and dishonesty, resulting from an individuals’ need to maintain their self-concept as an 
honest person.  They argue that small acts of dishonesty are easier to justify to oneself, 
generating an “activation threshold” level of dishonesty, below which the intrinsic rewards 
for honesty are not triggered and where dishonesty increases with economic incentives.   23 
 
However, once the threshold level is reached, dishonesty becomes unresponsive to changes in 
economic rewards, until these rewards become sufficiently large to overwhelm intrinsic 
rewards, and once again, dishonesty increases with economic rewards.  Mazar and Ariely 
(2006) argue that drawing attention to moral standards may lower the “activation threshold” 
for intrinsic rewards, making it harder to justify dishonesty to oneself.  Applying this to our 
results might explain why dishonesty is prevalent in the reporting task because it seems easier 
to justify to oneself a reporting mistake than outright stealing of money.  Further, compulsory 
reporting makes lying harder to justify because, like a moral code, it draws attention to what 
you are doing. 
A final explanation is related to status quo bias and the use of default options (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2009).  In both treatments, following an accident subjects had to select one of 
two options.  However, with voluntary reporting subjects may interpret “not reporting” as the 
implicit default option and this potential inertia could lead to less reports being filed in the 
case of voluntary reporting. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Self-reporting initiatives are often promoted as the way forward for cash strapped 
enforcement agencies.  Our results however suggest they are not a panacea and that careful 
design is required to achieve satisfactory  regulatory  outcomes.  This design should pay 
attention to not only the financial incentives for disclosure but also details of the reporting 
regime.  Our findings imply that given the right circumstances, almost everyone is prone to 
dishonesty  and regulators should design enforcement regimes with this in mind.    In our 
experiment, participants  were willing to be dishonest, which in the case of compulsory 
reporting required an outright lie, for a relatively small monetary gain.  In the experiment, 
dishonesty was at “arm’s length” from the money being exchanged.  Nevertheless, this is the 24 
 
case  for most “white collar” crimes, including  regulatory compliance and filing false 
insurance claims.  Recent moves to increased computerization of reporting systems (e.g. the 
EPA’s electronic reporting initiatives) only heighten these concerns. 
As dishonesty is influenced by both the context and incentives in place, it suggests 
ways forward for enforcement agencies beyond simply increasing enforcement efforts.  In 
particular, regulators should be cautious in using voluntary reporting instead of compulsory 
reporting, and this is even more so because those whose behavior changed the most with 
compulsory reporting were those who had been dishonest in the theft  task, i.e.  the 
compulsory regime led dishonest people to be more truthful and report accidents more often. 
Anecdotally, the observation that compliance rates are considerably higher for major water 
dischargers than for toxic and hazardous waste regulation (Magat and Viscusi, 1990) is 
consistent with our conjecture, with the latter involving only voluntary reporting.  More 
recently, Pfaff and Sanchiriro (2004) found that only relatively inconsequential violations are 
reported under the EPA’s audit policy (which uses voluntary reporting), compared with those 
uncovered with traditional enforcement procedures, and suggest that these could be “red 
herrings” to distract the agency from more substantial undisclosed violations. 
The  effect of self-reporting on preventative actions  is unclear but of primary 
importance given the prevalence of self-reporting initiatives. Our results suggest that the use 
of self-reporting can have unexpected effects, and points to future work in this area.   
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Table 1: Production Task Choices 
Probability of Accident  Trading Profit 
100%  27.50 
80%  26.31 
60%  24.51 
40%  21.45 
20%  15.03 
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Table 2a: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Task  Description  Mean  Std 
Dev 
Min  Max 
Risk Averse  Lottery  Switch to risky lottery after decision 5  0.77  0.42  0  1 
Correct Matrices  Theft  Number of correctly solved matrices  4.52  2.56  0  10 
Dishonest  Theft  Was subject dishonest or not  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Magnitude  Theft 
Dishonesty 




Theft  Maximum dishonest gain possible  15.48  2.56  10  20 
% Max Dishonest  Theft  Actual  dishonest gain as % of maximum 
possible 
0.15  0.32  0  1 
Period  Reporting  Period of the reporting task  15.5  8.66  1  30 
Compulsory  Reporting  Whether subject was in compulsory 
treatment 
0.49  0.50  0  1 
Accident  Reporting  Whether or not an accident occurred in a 
particular period 
0.74  0.44  0  1 
Report  Reporting  Whether an accident was reported or not in 
a particular period 




Reporting  Proportion of accidents that were reported  0.15  0.24  0  1 
ProbChoice  Reporting  Accident probability option chosen (over 
30 periods) 
2.35  1.10  1  5 
ProbChoice100  Reporting  Chose 100% accident probability (over 30 
periods) 
0.30  0.46  0  1 
ProbChoice80  Reporting  Chose 80% accident probability (over 30 
periods) 
0.22  0.41  0  1 
ProbChoice60  Reporting  Chose 60% accident probability (over 30 
periods) 
0.31  0.46  0  1 
ProbChoice40  Reporting  Chose 40% accident probability (over 30 
periods) 
0.15  0.36  0  1 
ProbChoice20  Reporting  Chose 20% accident probability (over 30 
periods) 
0.01  0.12  0  1 
Number  correct 
quiz answers 
Reporting    7.17  1.09  2  8 
Total earnings  n/a  Over all tasks  42.87  6.71  26.30  59.50 
Male  n/a    0.61  0.49  0  1 
Business or 
Economics Major 
n/a    0.60  0.49  0  1 
Age  n/a    19.45  2.35  17  33 
Born in Australia 
or NZ 
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Table 2b: Responses to the Survey Questions 




















I am more inclined to lie, the more 
I have to gain from the lie. 
 
18%  20%  39%  23%  0.30***  -0.38*** 
I am less inclined to lie, the greater 
the risk of discovery 
 
10  12  37  40  0.11  -0.19** 
You either lie or you don’t, there 
are no degrees of lying 
 
23  23  23  30  -0.04  0.19** 




   
Have you ever lied in an 
application  –  in writing or in an 
interview  –  for example when 
applying for work, membership, 
school, or scholarships? 
 
67%  14%  17%  2%  -0.01  -0.15 
Have you ever lied when selling 
something? 
 
66%  7%  21%  6%  0.04  -0.14 
Have you ever consciously 
reported false information in your 
income-tax return? 
 
93%  3%  3%  2%  0.10  -0.11 
How many times have you 
received a speeding ticket? 
 
85%  11%  2%  2%  0.07  0.04 
How many times have you driven 
when you believe your blood 
alcohol content exceeded the legal 
limit? 
 
75%  14%  10%  1%  0.13  0.04 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Probit Model of Reporting an Accident 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Report  Report  Report 
Period  -0.003**  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
Compulsory treatment  0.096**  0.089**  0.081** 
(0.045)  (0.043)  (0.037) 
       
(Accident) Probability 
Choice 
  -0.016  -0.019 
  (0.024)  (0.028) 
       
Risk averse    0.027  0.026 
  (0.069)  (0.071) 
       
Prob Choice * Risk 
averse 
  -0.014  -0.007 
  (0.030)  (0.032) 
       
Magnitude of dishonesty 
in theft task 
  -0.010*  -0.010* 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
       
Male      0.018 
    (0.038) 
       
Age      0.025*** 
    (0.008) 
       
Business or Economics 
Major 
    0.042 
    (0.035) 
       
Born in Australia or NZ      0.070 
    (0.047) 
       
Number correct quiz 
answers 
    -0.060*** 
    (0.015) 
       
N  1915  1915  1915 
 Prob > Chi-squared
a  0.0103  0.0007  0.0000 
Marginal effects reported in the table; robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Result of Wald test of model significance. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Correctly Solved Matrices
3.91  0.82  3.75 
1.11  1.69  7.94 
3.28  2.52  6.25 
9.81  6.09  2.46 30 
 
Figure 3a: Proportion of Individuals who Reported Accidents across Treatments 
 
Figure 3b: Distribution of the Proportion of Accidents Reported by Treatment 
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Figure 4: Choice of Probability of Accidents across Treatments 
 
 
1: Accident probability = 100%; 2: Accident probability = 80%; 3: Accident probability = 60%; 4: Accident 
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. Please read the following instructions 
carefully. A clear understanding of the instructions will help you make better decisions and 
increase your earnings.  
The instructions which we have distributed to you are for your private information. Please do 
not communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should you have any 
questions please ask us. Although there are many people participating in today’s experiment, 
everyone is working independently. This means that your earnings are based entirely on your 
decisions and what others do has no effect on you. 
 
At the end of the experiment we will give every participant 5 Australian Dollars in addition to 
the money that you will make in the experiment. You will participate in a number of tasks in 
this experiment and you will get information about each of these tasks one by one. Each task 
is independent and the decisions that you make in one task have no impact on your earnings 
in the other tasks.  
 
All decisions that you make today are recorded only by an anonymous subject number 
and will only be used for research purposes.  Your decisions will remain completely 
anonymous.  
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Task 1: Lottery Game 
 
In this task, you will be asked to make a choice between two options - Option A or Option B 
– 10 times. The options differ in the following way: 
 
OPTION A: pays $7 in cash always. 
 
OPTION B: has two possible payoffs, HIGH payoff = $12 or LOW payoff = $2 
 
Whether Option B pays the HIGH or LOW payoff will be randomly determined in the 
following way: 
 
At the end of the entire experiment, the experimenter will throw a ten-sided dice in front of 
you. The sides are numbered from 1 to 10 (the “0” face of the dice will serve as 10). If the 
number on the dice is associated with a HIGH payoff, then the payoff is $12. If it is 
associated with the LOW payoff, then the payoff is $2.  
 
For example, you might be shown the following two options: 
 
 
In the above example, choosing OPTION A pays you $7.00 no matter what the dice roll is. 
Choosing OPTION B will pay $2.00 if the number rolled is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7, and $12.00 if 
the number rolled is 8, 9, or 10. 
 
Actual Earnings in Task 1 
 
This experiment will begin with your making choices between Option A and Option B on 10 
different games (numbered Game 1 to Game 10, see the figure on the following page). Even 
though you will be asked to make a choice between Option A and Option B for 10 different 
games, your actual earnings in Task 1 will depend on your choice in only ONE of those 
games. At the end of the entire experiment the actual game that is played will be determined 
by rolling a ten-sided dice. The number rolled will be announced and then the dice will be 
rolled a second time to determine whether the payoff from Option B is HIGH or LOW. 
 
For instance suppose the first time the experimenter rolls a dice, the number 5 comes up. This 
means that Game 5 will be used to determine your earnings for Task 1. 
Next the experimenter will roll the dice again. If you chose Option A you will get $7. If you 
chose Option B and the dice roll turns out to be 1,2,3,4 or 5 then you earn $2 while if the dice 
roll turns out to be 6,7,8,9 or 10 then you get $12.  
 
Are there any questions? 
 
Please proceed to Task 1.  37 
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Task 2: Instructions 
 
Please do not open the envelope. Wait for experimenter instructions! 
 











In each matrix you should look for a unique set of numbers that sum up exactly to 10.  In some 
matrices you may not have a solution.  
  














For each matrix you solve, you will receive $1.00. You have 5 minutes for this task. 
 
Once 5 minutes are up you have to do the following:  
1.  Count the number of correctly solved matrices and write down the number of correctly 
solved matrices on the green collection slip. 
2.  Fold your matrix sheet and place it in the envelope that we are going to bring to you. This 
envelope will remain sealed until after all participants have left the lab. 
3.  On your desk you will find a small envelope containing 20 $1 coins.  Now pay yourself with 
the money provided in the small envelope on your desk. 
4.  Fold the collection slip and put it into the envelope with the leftover money, seal the 
envelope, and leave it on the table. This will only be collected at the end of the experiment 
after all the subjects have left the lab. 
 
All decisions that you make today are recorded only by an anonymous subject number and 
will only be used for research purposes.  Your decisions will remain completely anonymous.  
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Task 3: Production Decision  
In Task 3, you will make production decisions in 30 periods. This task has 2 parts and part 1 
has 10 periods and part 2 has 20 periods. At the end of today’s experiment we will randomly 
choose one of these periods using a bingo cage which contains balls numbered 1 to 30. You 
will receive your earnings from that chosen period. 
 
Instructions for Part 1: 
In this task you are responsible for making a production decision. When you produce, there is 
a chance that an accident will occur. Your production decision directly affects the probability 
of an accident. Reducing the probability of an accident is costly and will reduce your 
production earnings. Similarly increasing the probability of an accident will increase your 
production earnings.  
 
You will receive your production earnings regardless of whether an accident occurs. 
However there is a chance that you will be inspected. If you are inspected and if an accident 
occurred, then you will incur a fine. The probability that you will be inspected is 50% and if 
an accident has occurred then you have to pay a fine of $15.  
 
The table below shows you the relationship between the probability of an accident and your 
production earnings. For example if you choose the probability of an accident to be 40%, 
then your production earnings are equal to $21.45. If an accident occurs and you are 
inspected, you would have to pay a fine of $15. Your earnings in this case would be $21.45-
$15.00 = $6.45. This occurs 20% of the time (0.4*0.5 = 20%). In the remaining 80% of the 




You will pay a fine of $15 if an accident occurs and if you are inspected. Otherwise you will 
not pay a fine and you will earn $21.45. 
 
Whether or not you have an accident will be determined by the computer in accordance with 
your chosen accident probability and is independent across periods. This means that whether 
or not you have an accident this period is not affected by what happened last period. 
Similarly whether you are inspected or not is also determined by the computer and is not 
affected by previous inspection outcomes. 
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You will participate in 2 practise periods before the actual task begins. The earnings that you 
obtain in the practice periods will not count towards your final earnings. The practice periods 
are intended to help you understand how to make your decisions in this task.  We will also 
ask you to answer some questions to check your understanding of the instructions. 
 
Instructions for Part 2: [voluntary treatment] 
 
In this part 2, you will make the same production decision as in Part 1. In addition, you have 
an option to report whether an accident has occurred or not (see an example below). If you 
report that you had an accident, you will pay a self reporting fine of $12. If you do not submit 




You will participate in 2 practise periods before the actual task begins. The earnings that you 
obtain in the practice periods will not count towards your final earnings. The practice periods 
are intended to help you understand how to make your decisions in this task.  We will also 
ask you to answer some questions to check your understanding of the instructions. 
  
 
Instructions for Part 2: [compulsory treatment] 
 
In this part 2 you will make the same production decision as in Part 1. In addition, you will be 
asked to fill in a report about whether an accident has occurred or not (see an example 
below). If you report that you had an accident, you will pay a self reporting fine of $12. If 
you report that you have not had an accident, you will be inspected with 50% probability and 




You will participate in 2 practise periods before the actual task begins. The earnings that you 
obtain in the practice periods will not count towards your final earnings. The practice periods 
are intended to help you understand how to make your decisions in this task.  We will also 
ask you to answer some questions to check your understanding of the instructions. 